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Commons1 
Roger A. Lohmann 
West Virginia University 
Introduction 
The commons is a theoretical formalism that is useful in understanding 
many diverse problems of civil society. Commons models have been applied to 
major environmental issues from resource depletion to global warming 
(Ostrom, 1990), legal questions from land ownership to intellectual property 
and culture policy (Lessig, 2008), and to understand voluntary associations, 
nonprofit organizations and philanthropy (Lohmann, 1992; Van Til, 2000). 
Sciences, academic disciplines, professions and knowledge (Hess and Ostrom, 
2007) have all been instanced as important examples of commons. 
A common (or commons) is any economic, political, social, and legal 
institution that enables joint, shared, mutual or collective natural or social 
action by agents using a “pool” of shared or jointly held or mutually controlled 
resources. The noun common can refer to an actual, existing natural or social 
object (such as an ocean, a property or a philanthropic foundation), a unit of 
analysis or theoretical formalism (e.g., an ideal or theoretical type) or an 
element or figure in an abstract logical construct or narrative (e.g., “commons 
tragedy” or prisoner’s dilemma games) used to highlight or isolate certain 
related political, social, economic or legal phenomena.  
Common pool resources (CPR) refers to any collection of resources affected 
by and facilitating action (physical or social) by a plurality of natural, 
physical, legal, economic or social agents. The term common goods is used to 
characterize actual or planned products, outputs, goals, or desired ends of 
common choice or action.  
Historical Background 
Common fields agriculture is an ancient and medieval institution found in 
many areas throughout the world. English common law has engendered a 
rich vocabulary of practical and legal terms with precise (mostly agricultural) 
meanings, like common pasture (right to graze animals on common land), 
estover (right to collect wood from smaller trees), piscary (common rights to 
fish), tubary (right to collect sod), and mast (right to turn out pigs in the fall). 
 
1 A revised and edited version of this article was published in the International Encyclopedia of 
Civil Society. Springer Publishers. 2009. 513-520. 
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A widespread assumption has been that the “enclosure” (privatization) of 
property commons is a universal correlate of economic modernization and 
privatization of property. Even so, intellectual and academic interest in 
contemporary commons has grown across a broad front since the late 1960s, 
stemming from an essay in Science (Hardin, 1968) asserting a “tragic” 
trajectory in the tendency to over-utilize natural resources, for which the only 
viable solution was said to be public ownership and control. Although little 
employed by civil society researchers, Hardin’s analysis – like similar work 
by Mancur Olson (1965) and others – detailed various consequences of 
uncoordinated private decision-making. The commons model has continued to 
find many enthusiasts among researchers and theorists in environmental 
and life sciences, economics, law, history, political theory, agriculture, 
sociology and numerous other theoretical and applied disciplines that have 
invoked diverse models of commons, common pool resources (CPRs) and 
common goods to reframe an increasingly broad range of practical and 
theoretical issues. The literature on commons problems has grown so 
dramatically that reviewing it completely would be almost impossible. The 
International Association for the Study of the Commons (IASC) is an 
interdisciplinary research society formed in 1989 exclusively for work on the 
topic. (www.iascp.org/)  
International Perspectives 
 
To locate civil society commons studies relative to the larger body of 
commons research and the international interdisciplinary body of commons 
researchers, a literature review of a large body of recent work on the 
commons was conducted. (See Lohmann, 2008) A representative sample of 
the identified studies were categorized in a three-part typology as follows (see 
Figure 1): 
A substantial body of work exists detailing natural common resource pools 
acted upon by physical or biological agents (denoted as NRPs in Figure 1). 
These include studies of the electromagnetic spectrum, ‘associations’ of star 
galaxies, geothermal energy commons, microbial populations, and plant 
water use. Natural commons studies works within the basic commons model 
of a shared resource pool, identified natural “agents” and natural chemical or 
physical processes of “agency” responsible for changing the distribution of 
resources from that pool.  
There is also a second large body of work (denoted humanly-directed 
natural resource pools or DNRPs in Figure 1) on the human-natural 
environment interface, interspecies conflict and population density. One of 
the most widely studied topics is in the broad area of conservation, 
environmental and evolutionary biology and natural resource management 
and spatial issues. Much recent work on the commons specifically engages 
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human social institutions impacting natural resource pools. Historical 
investigations, for example, tend to focus on real, actual instances of past and 
present common agricultural lands and practices. There is a widespread false 
belief that common field agriculture was limited primarily to England and 
Wales in the late middle ages. This and widespread belief in the ineluctably 
“tragic” nature of common resource pool management are perhaps the two 
greatest fallacies associated with commons theory. 
Commons have also been located in most of the countries of Europe,  
Japan, India, Indonesia and countless other places. Common problems in law 
also extend to common arable fields, maintenance of shared property lines 
and a host of such issues (Ellickson, 1991). There is also a vast literature on 
fisheries and common pastures. Scrutton (1887) may be the earliest work in 
the vast literature on common field agriculture. The enclosure movement in 
Great Britain, which “enclosed” many common pastures and fields and 
“privatized” ownership has figured prominently in what Karl Polanyi (2001; 
first published in 1941) termed “the great transformation” as well as analyses 
of public welfare and charity systems. (e.g., Cloward and Piven, 1971) Many 
studies of commons emphasize local and community referents, and reinforce 
the sense of an intermediate stage between the public domain of nation state 
institutions and the purely private domains characterized by alienation, 
ownership, exclusion, and rivalry (the domain of civil society).  
Recent issues in information technology and copyright issues have shown 
the continuing impact of commons models. (Brown, 2002; Lessig, 2001). One 
of the important issues in current copyright debates, for example, involves 
efforts to privatize knowledge and corresponding efforts for the attempted 
identification of knowledge commons (Hess and Ostrom, 2006; Williams-
Jones, 2005). It is not an accident that there have been vast increases in the 
number of web-sites incorporating commons themes, including many 
associated with the “open source” movement. Two examples are particularly 
apt. Apache is the most widely used open-source web server on the internet, 
serving roughly half of all known websites. The data archive where Apache 
code “applets” are archived is known as the Apache Commons 
(commons.apache.org). Equally as significant is the Creative Commons 
licensure approach to copyright and intellectual property 
(creativecommons.org). The use of the term “commons” in both cases to 
signify a group-directed, collectively held, common resource pool has 
provoked a large and growing literature.  Both the Apache Commons and the 
Creative Commons actually function as common resource pools, drawn upon 
by human and electronic agents. 
Likewise, medical and health care research have taken interest in the 
commons along a variety of paths including studies of health, emergency 
medicine, family medicine, Canadian Medicare, pathology, and public health 
campaigns. 
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A large body of commons studies also take specific historical, geographic 
or community foci, including works on pastoralism, the Anasazi, the Buffalo 
Commons, cattle ranges, fish mining, groundwater, grasslands, rangeland, 
folkways. 
In addition, the environmental movement has provoked concern with 
global commons including oceans, atmosphere, and Antarctica and also world 
systems and global commons as public goods.  
Commons studies have also looked at a broad variety of topics more 
directly related to the role of commons in civil society, including a 
companionate concept termed the anti-commons to describe cases of exclusion 
of multiple rights. Harrington (2004) applied the commons model to civic life 
to suggest “an alternative analytical framework for civic engagement based 
on small-group interaction”. Carlsson and Berkes  (2005) addressed co-
management as “a continuous problem-solving process … involving extensive 
deliberation, negotiation and joint learning within problem-solving 
networks”. Antoci, et. al., (2006) and Kase, et. al. (2008), examined firms and 
nonprofit organizations as commons, with particular focus on trust and 
learning. Macy (2003) fit the commons model to collective action and the 
dilemma for organizers of balancing “efficacy” and “the free rider problem”. 
Casas-Corts, et. al., (2008) examined social movements.  
Other recognized civil society topics approached as commons include: 
mutual aid and self-help (Borkman, 1999); collective intelligence (Wolpert 
and Turner, 1999); cooperation (Helbing, et. al., 2005; Kollock, 1998); 
discourse (Ignatow, 2004), folkecology (Atran, et. al., 1999A; Atran, et. al., 
1999B); the future (Cain, 2003); governance (Ostrom, 1990); narcissism 
(Campbell, et. al., 2005); professional environments (Abbott, 2005); prosocial 
behavior (Brucks and Lange, 2007; reputation (Millinski, et.al, 2002); social 
issues (Aram, 1989); trans-generational altruism (Lehmann, 2007); 
universities (Brown, 2000) and volunteering (Semmann, et. al., 2003) 
While defined resource pool and agents (together with appropriate 
identification of causal mechanisms) may be both necessary and sufficient in 
consideration of natural commons, both humanly directed natural resource 
commons or purely social or artificial commons require economic, political 
and social explanations. In both cases, we may speak of the social 
organization of commons. 
Social Organization Of Commons 
The organization of natural commons is a matter completely outside our 
concern. The social organization of artificial commons, completely organized 
and directed by human social action, and human-directed common resource 
pools of natural resources, shown graphically on the left side of Figure 1, 
raise several interesting questions. Most notable is the question of what can 
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be said about the social organizations that create, direct and control CRPs? 
The remainder of this article addresses a social organizational perspective on 
commons problems in civil society, with particular attention to those 
involving associations, foundations, social movements, some nonprofit firms 
and other forms of collective and voluntary action. (Figure 1)  
Given the prominence of artificial and humanly-directed common resource 
pools, it is somewhat surprising how little sustained attention has been given 
to the question of their organization. Lohmann (1992) is one of only a few 
sources to examine this issue from the standpoint of general social and 
economic theory.  In that account, the presence of common resource pools, or 
shared resources, is one of three basic, defining conditions of the social 
organization of commons. Also important are voluntary, uncoerced 
participation of groups of people and mission, or a shared sense of goals or 
purpose.  
When groups directed by a joint mission control one or more common 
resource pools, several things are said to happen over time. First, a sense of 
philia, or camaraderie, or fellow-feeling will develop among the members; a 
development which itself can become a powerful resource for the commons. 
The resulting trust and networks of relationships that evolve form a 
distinctive and important form of social capital. At the same time, groups of 
voluntary participants, possessed of purpose and shared resources can also 
begin to evolve an emergent moral order, consisting of operating and 
procedural rules (e.g., by-laws), status systems (e.g., officers, membership 
requirements, etc.), and other more powerful mission and vision statements, 
and even manifestos, philosophies, and intentional communities and ways of 
life. As part of this process, individual participants frequently experience 
mild to profound modifications in their sense of personal identity. Thus, being 
a scientist or social scientist , a Christian or Buddhist, a Shriner, Elk or 
Moose, a computer hacker or an open source practitioner, are all examples of 
identities associated with distinct moral orders arising out of participation in 
commons. 
In the case of social commons, at least three important forms of common-
pool resources can be identified: One, of course, is money, credit, donations 
and other financial resources. Also particularly important in the case of 
religious organizations, museums, libraries, and other types of civil society 
organizations are collections of “priceless” objects that differ from business 
inventories in that the objects are valued for themselves and not for their 
exchange value. The mundane meaning of the term “priceless” applied to 
such objects connotes not only that they are not priced and not for sale, but 
also that their non-monetary (ritualistic, symbolic or other social) value is of 
greater importance.  
Finally, some of the most intriguing types of common pooled resources 
found in social commons are repertories of social skills, practices, 
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methodologies, and other social behaviors. Both the performance of such 
repertories and the underlying knowledge of such performances are 
important. Addressing repertories as common-pool resources open many 
possibilities for commons theory to bring together a broad variety of social 
science insights. For example, the sociologist Charles Tilly has identified 
important features of repertories of contention in pre-industrial social 
movements. Likewise, an important theorist of social capital, Pierre 
Bourdeau also offered an important study of practice that can be applied 
here. The strong emphasis on methodology in various social science research 
specialties is also an important form of repertory as a common-pool resource.  
Many different types of common pool resources are to some extent 
fungible, or convertible from one form to another, in commons: Thus, cash can 
be used to hire employees with expertise in particular repertories, purchase 
objects for a collection, or as tuition for development of new repertories. At 
the same time, collections can be used to attract large and small donations 
from patrons, and form the basis for all manner of repertories to evolve 
(archeological excavation and restoration, curation of objects d’art, 
propagation, preservation and myriad other distinct and identifiable 
repertories have evolved around different types of collections).   
An important discovery of commons theory has been that some types of 
repertory that are not initially viable commercially because no markets for 
them exist can be developed and refined by organizations in civil society 
possessing common resource pools. Some such developments will later 
become commercially viable while others do not. Thus, many forms of home 
health and education services were first developed with common pool 
resources and later became commercially viable. In some sense, commercial 
art galleries and companies selling classical music recordings are likewise 
dependent upon the prior existence of art museums and symphony orchestras 
to shape and develop tastes and preferences which art and music buyers can 
then act upon. 
Common resource pools in civil society are also important in processes of 
government formation. Public funds may not be available, for example, for 
the complex and elaborate repertories and social and political capital that a 
President, Prime Minister or Governor must engage to form a new 
government following an election. Identifying, recruiting and vetting suitable 
candidates are typically tasks undertaken by ad hoc networks of political 
parties, interest groups and other factions, utilizing common resource pooled 
funds donated – often by those expecting to receive some consideration from 
the new government.  
A staggering variety of terms exist in every language for different types of 
commons as social organizations: In English, we speak of groups, 
associations, clubs, societies, fraternities, sororities, sodalities, peer and 
friendship groups, parties, campaigns and many other terms to describe 
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pluralities of persons gathered together outside the bounds of the political 
state, economic markets or family-households for various shared, collective or 
mutual purposes. Foundations are an important form of legally constituted 
and formally organized common resource pool in contemporary civil society. 
Some forms of common resource pooling are purposely temporary: 
fundraising campaigns, parades, festivals and religious pilgrimages are 
notable examples. 
In the U.S., Section 501 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Act, for example, is 
one major enabling statute for a wide variety of common resource pools. 
Similar enabling legislation exists in most countries today. In the U.S., 
legislation tends to focus heavily on financial matters: Laws typically spells 
out the conditions under which financial resources may be pooled and held, 
conditions for defining membership and participation, and allowable 
circumstances for distributions from common resource pools, whether 
fisheries, forests or philanthropic foundations. “Property”, “contract”, “lawful 
purpose” and the “right of association” which explicitly includes both 
“peaceable assembly” and petitioning government for “redress of grievances” 
(a.k.a. advocacy) are important concepts around which the legal institutions 
for enabling common resource pooling are established in American life. Such 
legal principles obviously do not extend to natural commons, but only to 
common resource pools in which human agents are paramount in importance. 
Common Goods 
Lohmann (1992) also links a distinctive type of output of the concerted use 
of common pooled resources termed common goods as the product of 
production based on common resource pools. These are, he asserts, a distinct 
third category of goods distinct from both public and private goods. It is now 
clear that there are not one, but two categories of such intermediate goods: 
Those that are rivalrous, but not exclusive; and those that are exclusive but 
not rivalrous. (It is also possible that these may, in fact, be two different 
states of common goods under different circumstances.) These distinctions 
have typically been hedged in many civil society discussions with phrases like 
“quasi-private” goods and “semi-public” goods. We might simply term them 
“club goods” and “community goods”. 
Embracing two logically distinct intermediate types of common goods to 
supplant the two different forms of sort-of-private and quasi-public goods is a 
straightforward logical exercise invoked by removing in turn one of the two 
defining characteristics of public goods, as the contingency table (Figure 2) 
shows. Differentiation of rivalrous, non-exclusive (community) goods from 
non-rivalrous, exclusive (club) goods is also a key to understanding the 
importance of commons theory for civil society.  
In point of fact, the decision-making by agents of common resource pools 
in civil society are not restricted to any particular type of good. CRPs can be 
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used to produce all four types of goods shown in Figure 2. Thus, for example, 
the common resource pool of a private, or voluntary charity or faith-based 
organization may be utilized to make financial payments or provide services 
to individual poor, ill or other clients. As such, this constitutes production of 
an important form of private charity goods. In U.S. law and the English Poor 
Law tradition, efforts are made to carefully restrict such production (e.g., for 
the poor or sick, for educational purposes, etc.)  
Conversely, social clubs, membership organizations, and a bewildering 
variety of other associations are engaged in the production of (non-rivalrous, 
excludable) club goods, which may be available only to members as “member 
benefits” and non-rivalrous, often largely on the basis of disinterest on the 
part of nonmembers. Thus, members of stamp-collecting clubs may have 
exclusive access to certain first-issue stamps; a fact that may be of 
overwhelming disinterest to non-collectors. Non-collectors wishing to share in 
the benefit are encouraged to join and thereby become eligible. 
Club goods are significantly different from private and public goods but 
also from community goods, like various bodies of knowledge. An abstraction 
one might term the social organization of the calculus serves to illustrate the 
point. Calculus (like Shakespeare or Mandarin for English-speakers) is an 
esoteric but widely studied and important body of knowledge. First developed 
by Newton and Liebnitz and passed from teacher to student in mathematics, 
science and engineering since that time, calculus-knowledge might at first be 
thought to be a club good of sorts: the basis of an international society of those 
who know calculus. However, calculus is in several important senses, non-
excludable. Just about anyone on the planet could, with a little effort, have 
access to a calculus text, and there is no practical limit on the number of 
people who may learn calculus, and knowledge of calculus by anyone does not 
exclude, limit or restrict the ability of others to learn it; in fact, it facilitates 
it, as a subset of those who know calculus form the pool of those who teach 
calculus. However, the club of those who know calculus is, like many forms of 
knowledge, rivalrous in an important opportunity cost sense. Calculus is a 
rivalrous good in the important sense that life is short and the cost of 
learning calculus is measured in reduced time available to study 
Shakespeare or Mandarin or some other subject. Thus, calculus knowledge is 
not strictly speaking, a club good but rather a community good because of the 
effort involved in learning it and the exclusion resulting from the fact that 
not everyone can. 
Key Issues 
Currently, there are many different disciplinary, professional and cultural 
approaches to the study of commons, not all of them cognizant of one another. 
A key issue for future development is whether different threads of commons 
research and theorizing can be informed by, and profit from, one another. 
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Hess (2000) correctly notes that the commons theory presented in Lohmann 
(1992) was developed with little reference to the body of work presented 
through the IASC. Krashinsky (1995) made a similar observation of the 
dissimilarities between Lohmann’s third sector approach and the common 
goods economics of Ostrom, et. al. (Baden and Noonan, 1998; Ostrom, 1990; 
Ostrom, 1994, et. al.). In the same vein, work on natural resource commons 
or common good economics has likewise seldom been informed by even the 
most elementary understanding of civil society, associations, groups or 
organization research. Some groups engaged with common resource pools are 
sets of inanimate objects or chemical agents, insects or animals and other 
clusters completely outside the domain of civil society. But those in which 
agents controlling common resource pools are human social groups have 
much to gain from better understanding of the civil society context. 
Future Directions 
Examination of recent research on common resource pools shows three 
basic varieties. Natural resource pools are of relatively little interest to civil 
society studies. The other two branches, social or artificial common resource 
pools and humanly directed natural resource pools, are both of significant 
interest to civil society studies, and current research on these covers a 
bewildering variety of topics, issues and questions. No one can say for sure 
where commons studies are headed next. In fact, every few years we see the 
emergence of an entirely new and evocative branch of interest grounded in 
this fascinating metaphor, as Benkler (2006) has demonstrated most 
recently.  
See Also 
Mission 
Membership and membership associations 
Peasants’ and farmers’ organizations 
Social capital 
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Figure 1. Types of Commons:  
Social(SRPs), Directed Natural (DNRPs) and Natural Resource Pools (NRPs) 
 
Common Resource Pools 
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Meaningful 
Expressive/Spontaneous 
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Mission/Purpose 
Natural 
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Lifeworlds Systems  
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Congreg. 
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Figure 2 
Public, Private and Intermediate Goods 
 
 Non-exclusion Exclusion 
Non-rivalry Public Good Club Good 
Rivalry Community Good Private Good 
 
 
Figure 3 
Ostrom & Ostrom Version 
 
 Non-subtractability Subtractability 
Non-rivalrous Public Good Common Good 
Rivalrous Toll Good Private Good 
Ostrom & Ostrom, 1977 
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